Libya does not contribute due to its internal political environment limiting civil right and civil liberties, and a foreign policy marked by poor relations with the West. Libya, once shunned by much of the international community over the 1988 bombing of a PanAm plane above the Scottish town of Lockerbie, has undergone a dramatic rehabilitation (BBC 2006ae, par. 1). Its dramatic rehabilitation started when Tripoli formally took responsibility for the incident in 2003 (Ibid.). The move, part of a deal to compensate families of the 270 victims, heralded the lifting of UN sanctions (Ibid.). Months later, Libya renounced weapons of mass destruction, paving the way for a further blossoming of relations with the West (Ibid.). However, its participation will be highly controversial.
Initial variables of the data collection process:
UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.
Perception of peacekeeping
No record.
Domestic political environment
Colonel Muammar Qadhafi will remain secure in his position as head of state, supported by a network of tribal and political alliances, as well as the ubiquitous security services (EIU 2006bx, 1). There is currently tension in domestic politics as a result of Qadhafi’s son speaking out about his father’s government: Saif al-Islam Qadhafi has launched a strong attack on the current Libyan political system, declaring that the "revolutionary era" is over (Ibid., 3). In a speech given August 20, 2006 to a gathering of 15,000 youth activists, he declared that Libya was being run by a "mafia" of "crooks and agents" who were enriching themselves at the expense of the people (Ibid., 12 quoting Qadhafi 2006). “He contended that Libyans were further disenfranchised by the lack of free press in the country and by the absence of a truly democratic system”, however, “his father has launched a robust defence of his revolutionary system, and called for supporters to "kill" opponents of the regime” (Ibid., 3 quoting Qadhafi 2006). The court case over the alleged infection of Libyan children with HIV by five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor is nearing settlement (Ibid.).
On the surface, the conflicting statements by father and son appeared to signal a growing rift between the two, with Saif al-Islam prepared to challenge his father in order to stake his claim as senior pretender to the throne (Ibid., 13). But this does not affect the likelihood of Libya participating in UN peace operations. On closer analysis, however, their political posturing appears to be little more than a well-orchestrated act of Libyan political theatre (Ibid.). Although Saif al-Islam’s speech appears to be directed at the regime, its real purpose is first and foremost to enable Qadhafi to position himself when an eventual handover of power occurs (Ibid.). But Saif al-Islam’s succession is not guaranteed (EIU 2006bx, 14).
Domestic economic environment
Libya’s economy is dominated by the hydrocarbons sector—in 2003 it contributed an estimated 97% of export earnings and 86% of government receipts which represents 55% of nominal GDP (EIU 2006aa, 20). Despite the sanctions regime of 1992-99, the standard of living of ordinary Libyans remains one of the highest in the region, with revenue from the hydrocarbons sector being used by the government to subsidize basic foodstuffs, education, health and housing (Ibid., 21). Thus, it is not likely that Libyans will seek employment as peacekeepers.
Military affairs
The military (once staunchly supportive of Colonel Qadhafi’s leadership) became a potential source of organized dissent in the 1990s (Ibid., 12). Colonel Qadhafi has responded by periodically purging the senior levels of the army, ostracizing factions believed to be hostile to his leadership and replacing them with his own loyal followers, in order to dilute any potential threat to his rule (Ibid.).
The IISS estimates that Libya’s active armed forces number 76,000, which is significant in a country of around 5.5m people (Ibid., quoting IISS 2006).
The army accounts for about 45,000, of whom around 25,000 are conscripts. The navy numbers about 8,000 active personnel. Libya operates a selective compulsory military service of between one and two years. Reserves, known as the People’s Militia, total some 40,000. In addition, there are also many thousands of security agents. Libya’s 2003 defence budget was estimated at US$700m (about 3.1% of GDP), although this figure probably does not include substantial off-budget spending on domestic security and intelligence. Current defence spending, although high, is far below the levels seen in the 1980s, and after some modernization of equipment following the suspension of UN sanctions, expenditure now appears to be static. (Ibid., 18 quoting IISS 2006)
Foreign policy
With the US having removed Libya’s name from its list of "state sponsors of terrorism" in May 2006, Qadhafi’s international rehabilitation is all but complete (EIU 2006bx, 18). His regime will now attempt to consolidate its position within the international community, although a number of issues, such as the unresolved case of the six medical practitioners convicted for infecting Libyan children with HIV, will continue to cloud the country’s international relations (Ibid.). There is no data that specifies if Libyan forces will join a UN peacekeeping operation.
Notwithstanding this, Qadhafi will persist in attempts to play a more high-profile role on the global political stage, although these efforts will amount to little more than rhetoric (Ibid., 8).
This will be especially evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Libya will continue to be active, seeking to gain influence through financial and material beneficence. However, Colonel Qadhafi’s Africa policy is unlikely to secure much success, and will remain a point of contention with the larger sub-Saharan states, such as Nigeria and South Africa, which do not look kindly on attempts to undermine their own authority in the region. Relations with Arab countries will remain strained, and will be characterized by periodic bilateral disputes. However, the risk of Libya’s total estrangement from its Arab partners is negligible, as Colonel Qadhafi is unlikely to want to alienate himself completely from any of his regional neighbors while he attempts to establish a wider political role for himself. (Ibid.)
Climate changes
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.
Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.
